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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
In 2011, Mark Sheldon purchased a motorcycle and opted to insure it with 
Dairyland Insurance Company instead of National General Insurance Company, his 
automobile insurer.  After he was injured in a motorcycle accident in 2017, Sheldon 
recovered from the underinsured driver who hit him as well as from his underinsured 
motorist (UIM) coverage through Dairyland.  Still not fully compensated for his injuries, 
Sheldon then requested a payout from his UIM coverage with National General.  It 
denied the claim and sued in District Court1 for a declaration that it did not need to pay 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because National 
General is incorporated and has its principal place of business in North Carolina; Sheldon 
is a resident of Pennsylvania; and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  We have 




Sheldon, pointing to a provision in its policy (the “household vehicle exclusion”) that 
excluded coverage for accidents occurring while Sheldon was operating a household 
vehicle that was not insured on its policy (i.e., his motorcycle).  While admitting the plain 
language of the policy precluded coverage, Sheldon argues that the household vehicle 
exclusion in National General’s policy is invalid under Pennsylvania law.  The District 
Court agreed, granting summary judgment against National General.  Because we 
conclude the result is dictated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), we affirm. 
I.  
In 1990, Pennsylvania amended its Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 
(MVFRL) to codify a default rule of automobile insurance stacking for UIM coverage.  
1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1990-6 (West) (codified at 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1738).  When a person 
insures more than one vehicle with UIM coverage, the statutory default is that the 
policies will stack.  75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1738(a); Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137.  That is, the 
insured person is entitled to coverage equal to the “sum of the limits for each motor 
vehicle as to which [he] is an insured.”  Id. at § 1738(a).  An insured person may only 
waive the default rule of stacking by signing and dating a standard rejection form set out 
in the statute.  Id. at § 1738(d)–(e).  If an insured person signs a waiver, insurers are 
statutorily obligated to reduce his premiums.  Id. at § 1738(c). 
 





For years, Pennsylvania courts had rejected challenges to household vehicle 
exclusions, like the one at issue in National General’s policy, under the MVFRL.  See, 
e.g., Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 747, 748–49, 755 (Pa. 2002); 
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Baker, 972 A.2d 507, 508 (Pa. 2009); Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 955 
A.2d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided court, 18 A.3d 1093 
(Mem) (Pa. 2011).  That changed in 2019, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that a household vehicle exclusion was invalid because it violated the State’s statute on 
insurance stacking, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1738.  Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 132. 
In that case, Gallagher had sought both motorcycle and auto insurance from 
GEICO.  The company insured the motorcycle, but on a policy that was separate from his 
auto policy.  Id. at 132–33.  After Gallagher was injured in a motorcycle accident, 
GEICO only provided the UIM coverage amount listed in his motorcycle policy, refusing 
to provide the additional UIM coverage in his separate auto policy because of the 
household vehicle exclusion.  Id.  Gallagher argued that the exclusion violated the 
MVFRL because it effectively barred stacking his UIM coverage across all of his policies 
and did so in a manner that did not comply with Pennsylvania’s written-waiver 
requirement.  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, holding that “the household 
vehicle exclusion strips an insured of default [UIM] coverage without requiring an 
insurer to demonstrate, at a bare minimum, that the insured was even aware that the 
exclusion was part of the insurance policy. This practice runs contrary to the MVFRL and 





National General’s primary argument is that this case is distinguishable from 
Gallagher because it involves two different insurers and because it had no knowledge of 
Sheldon’s motorcycle.  Facially, we acknowledge that National General’s position is 
colorable and supported by policy arguments.  As a practical matter, the insurance 
company in Gallagher was better situated to consider the risks posed by the insured’s 
motorcycle compared with National General in this case.  Sheldon, when he signed a 
policy containing the household vehicle exclusion, entered a contract that on its face 
would clearly not cover his motorcycle accident and paid an agreed price for that 
coverage.  Invalidating that exclusion, in some sense, would provide Sheldon “benefits 
for which []he has not paid.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 352 F.3d 804, 810 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  And especially plausible is the argument that “these exclusions [go] to the 
scope of the [UIM] coverage in the first instance, before stacking questions are reached.”  
Baker, 972 A.2d at 515 (Saylor, J., concurring). 
However, our task is not to set Pennsylvania policy, and we are not writing on a 
blank slate.  Principles of federalism command that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
the last word on issues of Commonwealth law.  Where that Court has decided an issue, it 
is our role to apply its law to our cases.  And even when its cases do not squarely decide 
the state law issue before us, we must predict how that Court would resolve it.  See 
Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 343, 348 (3d Cir. 1997).   
Here, we predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the holding of 




Sheldon’s, the Court’s broad holding and reasoning is not limited to cases involving one 
insurer or to cases where the insurer knew about other household vehicles.  To the 
contrary, the Court “recognize[d] that [its] decision may disrupt the insurance industry's 
current practices” including in cases, like this one, “when multiple policies or insurers are 
involved.”  Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 138 n.6.  The Court appears to have considered the 
implications of that broad holding, but remained “confident that the industry can and will 
employ its considerable resources to minimize [its] impact,” such as by expanding 
disclosure obligations.  Id. 
We are satisfied that our conclusion accurately predicts how the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would resolve the present issue because it comports with a recent 
decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which said in a similar case that the 
“holding [of Gallagher] is not limited to the facts set forth [there], but one that finds that 
the exclusion is inconsistent with the requirements of Section 1738 of knowing waiver - a 
holding that is applicable to all policies for automobile insurance.”  Erie Ins. Exch. v. 
Petrie, 242 A.3d 915, 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 77 MAL 2021 (Pa. 
Feb. 18, 2021); see generally DiBartolo, 131 F.3d at 348 (“Applicable decisions of the 
Superior Court must be accorded significant weight.”); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 
128 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that decisions of the Pennsylvania intermediate courts are 
instructive in predicting how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the issue). 




The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gallagher compels a conclusion 
that National General’s household vehicle exclusion is invalid under Pennsylvania law.  
We thus affirm. 
